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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



Army and State Dept. review(s) . completed.

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Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AQ04900395001-5 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 17 February 1960 DAILY BRIEF 25X1 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR-Germany: At the recent meeting of bloc leaders in Moscow, Khrushchev is reported to have put forward a new 25X1 formula -- subsequently outlined publicly by East German Premier Grotewohl on 10 February--calling for two basically similar German peace treaties, one between the Western powers and Bonn and the other between bloc governments and East Germany. Grotewohl explained that this procedure would "do away No with objections" to signing a single treaty with both German states and lead to the "same results." Khrushchev may elab-25X1 orate on this modification at the May summit meeting. II. ASIA-AFRICA

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Israel-UAR-UN: Israel's boycott of the UN Mixed Armistice Commission meeting on 16 February, which dealt with recent fighting along the Israeli-Syrian border, may lead to UN Security

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Council consideration of the border dispute. Israel's antagonism is directed toward the UN Truce Supervision Organization as well as the UAR in this case because both oppose Israel's claim to sovereignty over the demilitarized zone in which the fighting occurred. A clash with Syrian forces in the central sector of the zone on 12 February, when two Israelis were killed, has again raised the prospect of Israeli reprisal action. 25X1 Belgian Congo: Brussels' recent announcement that independence with full sovereignty will be granted the Congo on 30 June has caused widespread anxiety among the Congo's 100,000 Europeans, and may lead to a substantial exodus. Europeans feel that Brussels is surrendering to virtually every African demand in the current round-table talks, and fear that Belgium will be unprepared to protect its nationals in the Congo during the post-independence period, which may well be chaotic. The prevailing feeling could strengthen secessionist sentiment in mineralrich Katanga Province, where the Europeans are politically well organized. The Consulate General in Leopoldville observes that an orderly transition period after 30 June will depend on the retention of a substantial cadre of Belgian civil servants. The maintenance of the Force Publique at its present strength would also be 25X1 essential. Iraq: A cabinet change announced in Baghdad on 16 February appears to be a jolt for Communist influence in the Iraqi Government. Following a struggle of some weeks over control of the agrarian reform program, the anti-Communist minister of interior, Brigadier Yahya, has been made acting minister of agrarian reform in addition to his other duties, while the pro-Communist former minister, Ibrahim Kubbah, has been relieved.

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Kubbah has also been dismissed from his post as acting oil minister, but in this case another extreme leftist, Minister of Planning Shaybani, has taken over the portfolio on an acting basis.

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DAILY BRIEF

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III. THE WEST

Cuba: The American Embassy in Havana believes that the most serious results of Mikoyan's visit to Cuba are the expressed intention of the Soviet and Castro governments to collaborate actively in the UN and the offer of technical assistance by the USSR. Embassy officials state that the Cuban Government has taken a long step toward putting itself definitely in the Soviet camp, that there is little possibility that the United States will reach a satisfactory relationship with the present regime, and that "time is working against us" as Castro's control over Cuban public opinion tightens

LATE ITEM

*USSR - Geneva Test Talks: The Soviet offer on 16 February to accept a set of temporary standards for detecting underground nuclear explosions, provided the West agrees to Khrushchev's plan for a fixed number of on-site inspections each year, is designed to further the USSR's objective of a treaty banning all tests and to undercut the recent American proposal for a limited treaty. An obvious move to divide the Western delegations, the Soviet plan adopts suggestions along these lines put forward by the British delegation on 15 January. An agreement on temporary control measures, which would obtain during the "approximately two- to three-year" period while a permanent control system was being installed, would also include a joint research program to perfect methods of detecting underground explosions. Moscow probably believes that this new concession, which in effect accepts the Western contention that almost any unidentified seismic event should be eligible for an on-site inspection, will make it increasingly difficult for the United States to continue its opposition to the Soviet scheme for 25X1 an annual quota of inspections -- a concept first advanced by Prime Minister Macmillan.

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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

During the recent meeting of bloc leaders in Moscow, Khrushchev reportedly made several proposals designed to strengthen Soviet efforts at the summit to persuade the West to negotiate a German peace treaty. 25X1 10		Moscow Meeting of Bloc Leaders Discusses Pre-Summit Strategy	
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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Israeli-Syrian Border Dispute May Go to UN Security Council

Israel's boycott of the meeting on 16 February of the Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC) to consider recent fighting in the demilitarized zone along the Israeli-Syrian border may lead to UN Security Council consideration of the dispute. UN Secretary General Hammarskjold has expressed readiness, if necessary, to call a council meeting on his own authority. Prior to such a meeting, however, there probably would be a "reaffirmation" of the UN position regarding the status of the demilitarized zone, perhaps in the form of a stern letter from Hammarskjold to Israel and the UAR.

The Israeli claim to sovereignty over the demilitarized zone has become a central issue in the dispute and was the reason for Israel's refusal to attend the MAC meeting. The Israelis deny that the MAC has any authority to discuss an issue involving Israeli sovereignty. The UN and the UAR, as well as the US Government, hold that the 1949 General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria left the status of the zone in abeyance pending a final Arab-Israeli settlement.

Israel has offered to meet separately with the Arab inhabitants of Tawafiq, the focal point of recent fighting within the zone, to discuss measures to enable them to cultivate the land they claim. The Israelis also have said they are willing to meet the Syrians "anytime and anywhere" to discuss peace and means of preserving order along their common border, while insisting that there be no discussion of the demilitarized zone.

A clash on 12 February in the central sector of the demilitarized zone, 25 miles north of Tawafiq, has again

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raised the prospect of Israeli reprisal action. The Syria apparently fired first, and two Israelis reportedly were killed in the two-hour fight. Israeli Chief of Staff Laskov is quoted as threatening new reprisals if the Syrians "sta	•
anything else."	25X1
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THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

